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Reconsidering  the  Costs 
of  Business  Cycles 
with  Incomplete  Markets 
1. Introduction 
In Models of Business Cycles, Robert Lucas (1987) puts forward a disarm- 
ingly  simple argument  that the potential  welfare  gains from eliminating 
the  fluctuations  in  aggregate  consumption  associated  with  business 
cycles  are, at best, extremely  small. His argument  is as follows:  Assume 
that  aggregate  consumption  is described  by  the  statistical model  ct = 
(1 + g)tzt,  where  zt  is  a  lognormally  distributed  random  shock  and 
(1 + g) is a deterministic  trend. Assume that there are complete  markets 
or perfect insurance  against individual  income  risk, and that consumers 
have  identical  constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA) preferences,  so 
that individual  consumption  is simply a fraction of aggregate  consump- 
tion. Then ask the question,  How  much would  consumers  pay to move 
to  a  world  in  which  aggregate  (and  individual)  consumption  has  no 
fluctuations?  In  this  alternative  world,  aggregate  consumption  is  de- 
scribed by the model  ct =  (1 + g)t. In particular, solve for the fraction X 
of consumers'  current consumption  stream that satisfies 
o E  pt((1  +  X)(1  + g)tzt)  =  E  3t(1 +  g) Y  (1) 
t=O  t=0 
Interpret  X as the  constant  fraction of  aggregate  consumption  at each 
date, and state that consumers  would  need  to be paid to give  them  the 
same  utility  they  obtain  from the  consumption  stream with  no  aggre- 188 *  ATKESON  &  PHELAN 
gate  fluctuations.  With  the  assumption  that  log  (zt)  is  distributed 
N(-az2/2,  (r2)  we  can  calculate  (1 +  X) =  exp((l  -  y)oz2/2).  Using 
numbers  like  y =  0  (log  utility)  or  y =  -4  for  the  curvature  of  the 
utility  function  and  .013 for  oa,  the  standard  deviation  of  aggregate 
consumption  around  trend,  we  get  welfare  costs  of  X =  .00008  or 
.00042. That is, we  get  the  answer  that  the  welfare  costs  of  aggregate 
fluctuations  are virtually zero. 
One  concern  about Lucas's calculation  of the  welfare  costs  of aggre- 
gate fluctuations  centers on the assumption  in his model  that there are 
complete  markets for insuring  individual  income  risk. In particular, in a 
setting  with  substantial  idiosyncratic  income  risk and  incomplete  mar- 
kets for sharing  that risk, the  marginal utility  of consumption  for each 
individual  in  the  economy  can  be  considerably  more  variable  than 
would  be  the  case if there were  complete  markets. Given  this possibil- 
ity,  it would  seem  that  large  welfare  gains  might  be  obtained  from  a 
countercyclical  policy  if that policy,  directly or indirectly,  allowed  con- 
sumers to obtain smoother  consumption  streams in equilibrium. 
In this paper,  we  measure  the  potential  welfare  gains  from counter- 
cyclical policy  in an economy  with  incomplete  markets. In the course of 
conducting  this measurement,  we  focus  on  two  questions  as central to 
the  determination  of those  potential  gains: (1) What is the likely  effect 
of  countercyclical  policy  on  the  nature  of  the  income  risk  faced  by 
individuals  in the economy?  and (2) What are the likely general equilib- 
rium effects brought  about as asset prices change  due  to the implemen- 
tation of countercyclical  policies? In taking up the first question,  we  see 
it  as  critical to  distinguish  whether  the  main  effect  of  countercyclical 
policy  is to reduce  directly  the income  risk faced by each individual  or 
is simply  to reduce  the correlation across individuals  in the income  risk 
that  they  face.  In  either  situation,  countercyclical  policy  will  have  a 
general  equilibrium  effect  on  welfare  if  it changes  asset  prices.  How- 
ever,  in  the  second  situation,  the  situation  in  which  countercyclical 
policy  simply  reduces  the correlation across individuals  in the risks that 
they  face, this is the only  effect such a policy  will have. 
In considering  the likely effect of countercyclical  policy  on individual 
risk, we  begin  with  the  observation  that  one  of the  salient  features  of 
the  business  cycle  is that  fluctuations  in  aggregate  hours  worked  and 
aggregate  wages  paid are not shared evenly  across the population.  That 
is, the  income  of workers  employed  continuously  over  the  cycle  does 
not  fluctuate  very  much  in  comparison  with  the  income  fluctuations 
experienced  by  those  who  transit from employment  to unemployment 
or from unemployment  to employment  over the cycle. This observation 
provides  some  justification  for focusing  on  the  unemployment  risk an Business  Cycle  Costs  with  Incomplete  Markets  ?  189 
individual  faces as the principal individual  income risk connected  to the 
business  cycle. 
In related work, Ay?e Imrohoroglu (1989) presents  a calculation of the 
costs of business  cycles in an environment  with incomplete  markets that 
focuses  on  unemployment  risk  as  the  individual  risk  that  would  be 
affected by countercyclical  policy.  Her model  does  not  allow  any  asset 
markets  through  which  agents  might  share  their  unemployment  risk. 
Instead, she assumes  that each agent  has an individual  storage technol- 
ogy  that  he  can  use  to  smooth  his  consumption  in  response  to  his 
income  fluctuations.  To calculate the potential  welfare gains from elimi- 
nating  aggregate  fluctuations,  she  compares  agents'  steady-state  utility 
when  they  are faced  with  two  different  exogenous  patterns  of unem- 
ployment  risk-one  that represents  the risks that individuals  face when 
there are business  cycles and one that represents  the risks that they face 
when  there are no business  cycles. She finds costs of aggregate  fluctua- 
tions that tend  to be small, but whose  size is quite sensitive  to the exact 
specification  of  the  individual's  storage  technology.  We  discuss  her 
paper and its relation to our work in some  detail. 
In  the  next  three  sections,  we  reconsider  the  calculation  of  the 
potential  welfare  gains from countercyclical  policy  in an economy  with 
incomplete  markets.  In the  first of  these  sections,  we  discuss  theoreti- 
cally  the  different  effects  on  welfare  of  countercyclical  policies  that 
reduce  aggregate  fluctuations  by  reducing  individual  income  risk di- 
rectly and countercyclical  policies  that reduce  aggregate  fluctuations  by 
reducing  the  correlation  across individuals  in  their income  risk. In the 
second  of these  sections,  we  present  a model  of the wage  and employ- 
ment  risk  faced  by  individuals  over  the  cycle  in  which  the  levels  of 
those  risks are chosen  endogenously.  On  the  basis  of  that  model,  we 
argue  that  the  main  effect  of countercyclical  policy  aimed  at reducing 
aggregate  fluctuations  may be  simply  to remove  the  correlation  across 
individuals  in  the  unemployment  risk that  they  face. In this  case,  the 
main impact  of countercyclical  policy  on individual  welfare  is through 
its  general  equilibrium  impact  on  asset  prices.  In  the  third  of  these 
sections,  we  use asset price data in a model  with  incomplete  markets to 
assess  the potential  gains  from removing  the correlation in individuals' 
unemployment  risk. As a theoretical  point,  we  show  that the  potential 
welfare  gains  from  eliminating  the  correlation  in  individuals'  income 
risk  in  a  given  environment  is  smaller  when  there  are  incomplete 
markets  than  when  there  are complete  markets.  On  the  basis  of  our 
interpretation  of asset price data in an incomplete  markets framework, 
we  argue  that  the  potential  welfare  gains  from  countercyclical  policy 
are essentially  zero. 190  '  ATKESON  &  PHELAN 
2. Aggregate  and Individual  Risk in Incomplete  Markets 
Under  the  assumption  that  there  are  complete  markets  for  ensuring 
individual  income  risk,  aggregate  risk  is  the  only  risk  that  affects 
individual  consumption.  If aggregate  risk is  eliminated,  all individual 
consumption  risk is also  eliminated.  For this  reason,  in  calculating  the 
welfare  costs  of  aggregate  risk with  complete  markets, it is not  neces- 
sary to  consider  the  direct  effect  of  countercyclical  policy  on  the  pro- 
cesses  that  generate  individual  income  streams. All that matters is the 
effect  of  countercyclical  policy  on  aggregate  income.  With  incomplete 
markets,  on  the  other  hand,  this  is  not  the  case.  With  incomplete 
markets,  the  fluctuations  in  an  individual's  consumption  are  deter- 
mined  by the fluctuations  in that individual's  income  and the  extent  to 
which  that agent can trade his variable income  for smooth  consumption 
through  storage  technologies  or asset markets. As a result, when  one  is 
calculating  the welfare  gains from countercyclical  policy  in an economy 
with  incomplete  markets, it is necessary  to describe more precisely  how 
such  policies  affect individuals'  income  risk and  market opportunities. 
Obviously,  this  can  be  done  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  In  the 
following  example,  we  highlight  how  one's  calculation  of the  potential 
gains  from  countercyclical  policy  depends  on  various  assumptions  re- 
garding  individuals'  income  risk and market opportunities. 
Consider  a world  with  a continuum  of agents  in which,  each period, 
each agent  faces a probability  rT(z)  of being  employed  and, as a result, 
receiving  high  income  yh  and  probability  (1 -  Tr(z)) of  being  unem- 
ployed  and  receiving  low  income  yt, where  z  is an  aggregate  state of 
nature.  Here  z  indexes  the  aggregate  state  of  the  economy  in  that  it 
determines  not  only  an  individual's  probability  of  receiving  high  in- 
come but also the proportion  of individuals  receiving  high income.  This 
proportion  changes  over  time  as  the  aggregate  state  z  changes,  and, 
thus, this economy  experiences  aggregate  fluctuations. 
Consider  two  ways  that  countercyclical  policy  might  reduce  aggre- 
gate fluctuations  in this economy.  One method  would  involve  reducing 
the  variance  of individual  income:  In the  extreme  such  a policy  could 
eliminate  aggregate  fluctuations  by eliminating  entirely  the variance  in 
each individual's  income.  A second  method  would  involve  reducing  the 
correlation  across individuals  in  the  income  risk that they  face: In the 
extreme,  such  a policy  could  eliminate  aggregate  fluctuations  by elimi- 
nating  the  correlation  across individuals  in  the  income  risk that  they 
face  without  changing  the  characteristics  of  the  income  risk faced  by 
any  single  individual.  For the  example  earlier, the  first type  of  policy Business  Cycle  Costs  with  Incomplete  Markets  ?  191 
might  set  individual  income  constant  each  period  and  equal  to  its 
unconditional  mean  Ez{Tr(z)yh  +  (1 -  r(z))yl}.  If  z  were  i.i.d.,  the 
second  type  of policy might  set the probability Ir(z)  constant  and equal 
to  its  unconditional  mean  Ez'r(z)  but  leave  the  realizations  yh,  y1 
unchanged.  This policy  would  eliminate  aggregate  fluctuations  in  in- 
come  but  would  leave  the  unconditional  distribution  of  individual 
income  unchanged. 
With complete  markets, these  two  policies  have  the  same  impact  on 
aggregate  income  and,  thus,  have  the  same  impact  on  consumer  wel- 
fare. With incomplete  markets, these  policies  have  different  effects.  To 
begin,  assume  that there  are no  asset markets and  that agents  have  no 
ability to store consumption,  so that individual  consumption  is always 
equal  to individual  income.  In this case, under  the  first type  of policy, 
each  agent's  utility  is improved  to  the  extent  that  the  volatility  of  his 
individual  income  streams is reduced.  Under  the second  type  of policy, 
each  agent's  utility  is  unchanged  since  this  type  of  policy  does  not 
change  the  unconditional  distribution  of  agents'  income  and,  thus, 
consumption,  streams.  Going  further,  assume  that  asset  markets  or 
technologies  for storing  consumption  do  exist but  that, in equilibrium, 
countercyclical  policy  leaves  asset prices or these  technological  returns 
unchanged.  Then  it  is  easy  to  show  that,  under  the  second  type  of 
policy,  agents'  utility  is  also  unchanged.  Agents  use  asset  markets  or 
storage  technologies  to  transform  income  streams  into  consumption 
streams. If asset prices or technological  returns are unchanged  and  the 
distribution of individual  income  streams is unchanged,  then  this trans- 
formation  and, thus, individual  utility are unchanged. 
It is clear that if the main effect of countercyclical  policy  is to remove 
correlations  in  individual  risk,  the  benefits  of  such  a  policy  will  be 
realized  through  the  general  equilibrium  impact  of  such  a  policy  on 
asset prices. If asset prices do change  when  the correlations in individ- 
ual risk are reduced,  then agents may gain if they are able to trade their 
variable income  for smoother  consumption  at the new  prices. 
For example,  one  interpretation  of Lucas's calculation  of the  welfare 
costs of aggregate  risk under complete  markets is that it is the answer to 
the  question,  How  much  would  the  representative  agent  pay  to  face 
asset prices that clear markets when  aggregate  consumption  is constant 
as  opposed  to  facing  asset  prices  that  clear  markets  when  aggregate 
consumption  fluctuates? When  aggregate  consumption  fluctuates,  asset 
prices  also  fluctuate  to  induce  agents  to  choose  to  have  fluctuating 
consumption.  When  aggregate  consumption  is constant,  asset prices are 
constant,  and  agents  choose  to  have  constant  consumption.  The  asset 192 - ATKESON  &  PHELAN 
price  fluctuations  implied  by  Lucas's model  are small.  As a result,  he 
finds a low  cost of aggregate  fluctuations. 
Given  this interpretation  of Lucas's result, another  concern  about his 
calculation  is  that  his  model  is  not  even  remotely  consistent  with 
commonly  observed  features  of  asset  price  data. If the  purpose  of  the 
model  is to measure  the amount  that the representative  agent is willing 
to  pay  to  move  from  a  world  with  asset  prices  like  those  currently 
observed  to  a world  with  asset  prices  that  allow  insurance  against  all 
risk, it would  seem  important  that  the  model  with  aggregate  fluctua- 
tions  be  consistent  with  currently  observed  asset  prices.  In particular, 
when  interpreted  in the context of a complete-markets,  frictionless-trad- 
ing,  consumption-based  model  of  asset  prices,  the  equity  premium  is 
evidence  that  the  representative  consumer's  marginal  utility  of  con- 
sumption  is  dramatically  different  at  different  stages  of  the  business 
cycle and, thus, that policies  that smoothed  consumption  and marginal 
utility  over  the  cycle  could  improve  the  utility  of  the  representative 
consumer  substantially. 
The  equity  premium  in Lucas's model  is essentially  zero.  To under- 
stand  the  implications  of  the  equity  premium  in  standard  versions  of 
such  models,  recall that asset prices in these  models  are described by a 
stochastic  process  Mt,  known  as a pricing kernel, which  satisfies  Mt = 
Et[Ri, t+Mt+1],  where  R  i, t+  is the gross return on asset  i if held  from 
date  t  to  date  t +  1 and  Mt  is identified  with  the  marginal  utility  of 
consumption  at  t  for  the  representative  consumer.  As  surveyed  in 
Cochrane and Hansen  (1992), the conclusion  of empirical work on asset 
prices  using  frictionless,  complete-markets,  consumption-based  models 
is that the pricing kernel and, thus, the marginal utility of consumption 
of  the  representative  consumer  must  be  extremely  volatile  if  these 
models  are to have  hopes  of matching  the  equity  premium.  In light  of 
the concern  that models  that fail to predict a large equity premium  may 
also  fail  to  measure  accurately  the  volatility  of  marginal  utility  and, 
thus,  understate  the  welfare  cost  of  business  cycles,  we  design  our 
model  for measuring  the  potential  benefits  of countercyclical  policy  to 
be consistent  with  the  equity  premium  and  other data on  the volatility 
of asset returns. 
This idea  that countercyclical  policy  may  improve  welfare  by chang- 
ing  asset  prices  raises  the  question  of  how  Imrohoroglu  (1989)  finds 
positive  gains  to  removing  business  cycles,  since,  in  her  model,  she 
assumed  that there were  no  asset markets but that agents  had  a linear 
storage  technology  for smoothing  their income.  The answer  lies in the 
way  she removes  aggregate  risk. She let the probability  tr(zt  +)  that an Business  Cycle  Costs  with  Incomplete  Markets  ?  193 
agent  is  employed  at  date  t +  1  depend  on  whether  the  agent  was 
employed  at  date  t.  She  further  allowed  the  aggregate  shock  z  to 
follow  a Markov process. In particular, she uses  data on the conditional 
duration  and  level  of  unemployment  in  booms  to  define  a transition 
matrix  that  determines  an  individual's  movements  between  employ- 
ment  and  unemployment  in  booms.  Likewise,  she  defines  the  corre- 
sponding  individual  transition matrix for recessions.  She also uses  data 
on  the duration  of booms  and recessions  themselves  to define  a transi- 
tion  matrix that determines  the  evolution  of aggregate  state. She  then 
specifies  a world  with  no  aggregate  fluctuations  by  using  data on  the 
unconditional  duration  and level  of unemployment  to calibrate a single 
transition matrix determining  individuals'  movements  between  employ- 
ment  and unemployment. 
One  interpretation  of her model  is that individual  employment  and 
unemployment  have  two  different  levels  of stability. One  can think  of 
an individuals'  labor market status as having  four states: stable employ- 
ment,  unstable  employment,  stable  unemployment,  unstable  unem- 
ployment,  with  a transition  matrix between  these  four  states  defined 
implicitly by the transition matrices described  earlier. Aggregate  fluctu- 
ations  arise due  to an assumed  perfect correlation across individuals  in 
the stability of their employment  and unemployment.  In booms,  every- 
one  has  either  stable  employment  or unstable  unemployment,  and  in 
recessions,  everyone  has  unstable  employment  or  stable  unemploy- 
ment.  This interpretation  suggests  an  alternative  method  for eliminat- 
ing aggregate  fluctuations  in her model. Maintain her four-state Markov 
process  describing  individuals'  labor  market  transitions  but  eliminate 
correlations  across  individuals  in  these  transitions,  i.e.,  eliminate  the 
correlation across individuals  in the stability of their individual  employ- 
ment  and  unemployment.  While  both  methods  eliminate  aggregate 
fluctuations,  with  prices pinned  down  by the assumed  storage technol- 
ogy,  the welfare  gain to simply  eliminating  correlations in employment 
stability across individuals  is identically  zero. 
3. Countercyclical  Policy  and Endogenous 
Unemployment  Risk 
We now  consider  the  question  of whether  the  main  effect of  counter- 
cyclical  policy  is  to  reduce  individual  income  risk  or  to  eliminate 
correlations  across  individuals  in  the  income  risk  that  they  face.  To 
address  this question,  we  build  a model  of the income  risk individuals 194 *  ATKESON  &  PHELAN 
face.  In  our  model,  labor market  frictions  prevent  firms and  workers 
from  using  the  production  technology  to  share  the  risk  implied  by 
random  productivity,  say,  by  proportionally  reducing  the  wages  re- 
ceived  and  hours  worked  by  all agents  in  a recession.  In our  equilib- 
rium, some workers become  unemployed  and receive  no income,  while 
other  workers  keep  their jobs and  receive  income.  The extent  of wage 
and unemployment  risk is determined  endogenously:  Workers trade off 
higher  wages  against  a  higher  risk  of  unemployment.  Also,  in  this 
model,  equilibrium  wages  are  rigid  in  the  sense  that  anticipated,  or 
long-term,  changes  in  worker  productivity  are  reflected  in  wage 
changes,  while  unanticipated,  or short-term, changes  in worker produc- 
tivity are reflected  in changes  in the number  of workers  employed  and 
unemployed.  We demonstrate  in this model  that, while  a countercycli- 
cal policy  that smoothes  out  aggregate  fluctuations  in worker  produc- 
tivity does  eliminate  the wage  risk faced by employed  workers and the 
profit risk faced by owners  of firms, it has no  effect on  the  unemploy- 
ment  risk faced  by  an  individual  worker.  Instead,  this  policy  simply 
eliminates  the  correlations  across  workers  in  the  unemployment  risk 
that  they  face.  Given  that  the  wage  risk faced  by  workers  employed 
continuously  over  the  cycle  that  we  observe  in  the  data  is  relatively 
small, we  use  this result to argue that the main effect of countercyclical 
policy  on  workers  is to  eliminate  the  correlations  across individuals  in 
the unemployment  risk that they  face. 
Consider  an  economy  with  two  types  of  agents:  capitalists  and 
workers. Time is discrete and denoted  by  t =  0,1, 2, 3,....  Each capital- 
ist is endowed  with  a production  technology  that transforms the labor 
of  one  worker  into  0  units  of  consumption,  where  0  is  random  and 
cannot  be verified by the workers.  At each date, the  distribution  of the 
productivity  term Ot  is the same for each capitalist. Specifically, let it be 
uniformly  distributed  over  [0, b(zt)],  where  zt  is  an  aggregate  state 
variable.  The  realization  of  Ot  is  independent  across  capitalist.  The 
aggregate  state  zt  follows  a  Markov  process  with  transition  matrix 
'r(z', z). Each worker is endowed  with  one  unit of labor and derives  no 
utility  from leisure.  Capitalists have  preferences  EoEtP3tck and  workers 
have  preferences  EoEt3t(cl)Y'  where  Y e  (0, 1]. 
At each  date,  each  worker  is matched  with  a capitalist  prior to  the 
realization of the aggregate  state z and the individual  productivity  term 
0 for the capitalist. These matches last only one period, and each period 
each  worker  matches  with  a  different  capitalist.  This  rules  out  the 
possibility  of  a long-term  contract  between  a capitalist  and  a worker. 
Capitalists have  no ability to commit  to contracts, i.e., if a capitalist and 
a worker match on the basis of an agreement  to a wage  w, the capitalist Business  Cycle  Costs  with  Incomplete  Markets  ?  195 
will  fire the  worker  rather  than  pay  w  if  0 <  w  is  realized.  In  each 
period,  the  aggregate  state  z  is revealed  only  after that  period's  spot 
market  trades  between  capitalists  and  workers  have  been  completed. 
This  assumption,  together  with  the  assumption  that  Ot cannot  be 
observed  by  the  worker,  rules  out  the  possibility  of  workers  and 
capitalists contracting  on  a wage  wt that depends  on  the realization  of 
Ot or  of  zt.  Further,  this  implies  that  the  capitalist  will  not  pay  the 
worker  and  the  worker  will  not  work  if  Ot  <  wt,  giving  the  worker 
wage  income  of zero at  t. 
For  simplicity,  assume  that  there  are  no  asset  markets  or  storage 
technologies  so  that  each  worker  simply  eats  his  wages  each  period, 
and  each  capitalist  simply  eats  his  profits.  This  assumption  rules  out 
wealth  effects that complicate  employment  contracts. Assume  that there 
are more  capitalists than  workers,  so that the  wage  offered  to workers 
each  period  is  chosen  to  maximize  the  worker's  ex  ante  welfare,  or 
solves 
max  w'  1 -  b  rr(z' z),  (2)  w  ,  z  )  '  ' 
where  (1 -  w/b(z'))  is  the  worker's  probability  of  being  hired  if  the 
wage  is w and  z' is the aggregate  state realized  at  t. 
The solution  to this problem is to set the wage  at 
w()  = 
Y +  1  b(  z)  1'  (3) 
where  Ez[l/b(z')]  =  Ej,[1/b(z')]r(z',  z).  The  worker's  unconditional 
probability  of  being  employed  is  constant  each  period  at  l/(y  +  1). 
Nevertheless,  the number  of workers  employed  in aggregate  state  z' is 
(1 -  w(z)/b(z')).  The value  of aggregate  output  conditional  on  transi- 
tion (z', z) is 
Y(Z  Z)  -  w(z)  (b(z')  +  w(z))  y(z,z)  =  k 
b(z)J  2  (4) 
Thus, the rate of unemployment  and the level  of output  fluctuate  over 
time  as  the  aggregate  state  changes.  Note  that  the  wage  in  the  next 
period  rises when  the  aggregate  state today  indicates  higher  expected 
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indicates  lower  expected  productivity  in the next period. That is, antici- 
pated  changes  in  worker  productivity  are reflected  in  wages.  On  the 
other hand, unemployment  in the next period rises when  the aggregate 
state tomorrow  is lower  than its expected  value  today  and likewise  falls 
when  the  aggregate  state  tomorrow  is higher  than  its expected  value 
today.  That  is,  unanticipated  changes  in  worker  productivity  are  re- 
flected  in changes  in the level  of unemployment. 
Now  consider  the  effects of a government  policy  that somehow  sets 
b(z') equal to a constant  b, and in particular, let  b be the expectation  of 
b(z') under  its stationary distribution. Under  this policy,  the wage  is set 
to w =  (y/y  +  1)b, the unconditional  probability an agent  is employed 
is  again  l/(y  +  1),  and  aggregate  output  is  constant  at  (l/(y  + 
1))2(b/2).  Clearly, this  policy  eliminates  aggregate  fluctuations.  Wages 
rise on  average  and  the  long  run  expected  value  of  aggregate  output 
and  profits  fall. Thus,  while  this  countercyclical  policy  does  eliminate 
the wage  risk faced by workers who  are employed,  the unemployment 
risk that workers  face is unchanged.  That is, this policy  simply  removes 
the correlation  across workers in this risk.1 
The  preceding  model  is  obviously  stylized.  To  what  extent  does  it 
generalize?  One  clear deficiency  of this simple  model  is that the unem- 
ployment  rate is i.i.d. over  time.  Here  we  present  an  extension  of  the 
preceding  model  that predicts  serial correlation  in  the  unemployment 
rate  and  yet  still  has  the  feature  that  countercyclical  policy  simply 
removes  the  correlation  in  individual's  unemployment  risk.  Assume 
now  that matches  between  capitalists  and  workers  can last more  than 
one  period, but the productivity  of a match  0 remains constant  as long 
as that match lasts. Let pL(z)  represent  the probability in aggregate  state 
z that an ongoing  match continues  for at least one more period. Assume 
that workers  who  are unemployed  enter  into  new  matches  requesting 
wage  w. They  are employed  if the productivity  of that new  match  0 is 
1. In this version of the model, it is difficult to consider the welfare implications of 
countercyclical  policy, since the implementation  of such a policy changes the division 
of output between the two types of agents. If one alters the model to assume that 
workers  have an equal ownership share in all firms  and, thus, divide aggregate  profits 
between them, it is possible to consider  the impact  of countercyclical  policy on welfare 
but impossible  to derive closed form solutions for wages and unemployment  risk due 
to wealth effects. If these wealth effects are small, then the results on unemployment 
risk obtained earlier  are approximately  correct  in this altered  version of the model. In 
fact, in every numerical example that we  have tried, workers' unemployment risk 
actually increases when  countercyclical  policy is  implemented. Further, as earlier, 
wages rise, and expected output and profits  fall. The impact of countercyclical  policy 
on welfare is unclear.  If agents are very risk averse, the benefits of smoothing profits 
outweighs the loss in expected output, and, thus, agents gain from countercyclical 
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greater  than  w. They  remain  employed  at that  wage  by  the  capitalist 
until that match dies. If a match dies at the end  of period  t, the worker 
enters  the  search  pool  at the  beginning  of  period  t +  1 and  draws  a 
new  match with  another  capitalist. When  z is i.i.d., the  solution  to this 
model  can  be  described  by  the  following  equations:  Let  Vs be  the 
beginning  of period  value  of being  in the  search pool  and V(w) be the 
value  of being  employed  in a match at wage  w. Then, 
V(w)  =  u(w)  +  pEz[p(z)V(w)  +  (1  -  p(z))V],  (5) 
and 
V, =  max Ez  -b(z)  1-  )()  (6) 
w  b(z) 
The  reservation  wage  w*  is  the  argmax  of  the  right-hand  side  of 
Equation  (6)  and  is  constant  over  time.  Note  that  this  is  a  standard 
search model  except  for the  fact that the wage  a worker receives  is his 
reservation  wage  rather than his productivity. 
In this model,  at each  date  t, individuals  who  are employed  have  a 
higher  chance  of being  employed  at t +  1 than do individuals  who  are 
unemployed  at t. Likewise,  individuals  who  are unemployed  at t have 
a higher  chance  of being  unemployed  at t +  1 than do individuals  who 
are  employed  at  t. This  serial correlation  in  the  individuals'  employ- 
ment prospects  introduces  serial correlation in the aggregate unemploy- 
ment  rate. Thus, even  though  z is i.i.d., the unemployment  rate in this 
model  is serially correlated.2 
In  this  model  it  remains  the  case  that  government  policies  that 
stabilize  b(z)  and  p(z)  simply  remove  the  correlation  in  individuals' 
risk in transiting from unemployment  to employment  or vice versa. As 
before,  the  probability  that  an  agent  in  the  search  pool  becomes  em- 
ployed  equals  1 -  wEz(l/b(z)).  With  quite  a  bit  of  algebra,  one  can 
show  that, again  as before,  the  optimal  w  for an agent  adjusts so that 
this  unconditional  probability  is  constant.  Thus,  this  policy  smoothes 
the unemployment  rate simply by removing  the correlation in individu- 
als' unemployment  risk. 
2. For example, when  z  takes on  two values, 1 and 2, with probabilities 
I  of each 
realization, b(l)=  8, b(2)=  12,  (1) = .95, ,(2)=  .99, B = .98, and y = .3, then the 
steady-state  unemployment  rate is .06 and the serial  correlation  in the unemployment 
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Our purpose  in presenting  these  models  is to demonstrate  the possi- 
bility  that  the  main  effect  of  countercyclical  policy  may  simply  be  to 
eliminate  the correlation across individuals  in unemployment  risk when 
that risk is determined  endogenously  as a result of workers' and firms' 
strategies  in  the  labor market. In these  models,  workers  choose  strate- 
gies  for accepting  or rejecting wage  offers trading off higher  wages  for 
higher  risks of being  unemployed.  Upon  implementation  of a counter- 
cyclical policy,  workers'  search  strategies  adjust in such  a way  to hold 
constant  each individual's  unconditional  unemployment  risk. 
From here  on,  we  proceed  with  the  presumption  that  the  business 
cycle  component  of the wage  risk of the employed  and the profits risk 
of  the  owners  of  firms  is  unimportant  in  determining  the  potential 
welfare  gains  from  countercyclical  policy.  Instead,  we  focus  solely  on 
the  effects  of  countercyclical  policy  on  individual  unemployment  risk. 
We maintain  that the  effect of such  policies  is to eliminate  the  correla- 
tion across individuals  in the unemployment  risk that they  face. In the 
next section, we  consider  the potential  gains from countercyclical  policy 
achieved  through  their general  equilibrium  effect on asset prices. 
4. Asset Price  Data and the Gains  to Eliminating 
Aggregate  Risk 
We  have  argued  earlier that  calculation  of  the  welfare  costs  of  aggre- 
gate  risk requires  calculation  of the  changes  in  asset  prices  that result 
from eliminating  aggregate  risk. In this section,  we  use  a simple  model 
of  asset  prices  in  incomplete  markets  to  argue  that what  little welfare 
gains exist from eliminating  aggregate  risk are due  to the elimination  of 
variability in bond  returns. With aggregate  fluctuations,  agents  tend  to 
want  to borrow  when  bond  returns  are high  and  want  to lend  when 
bond  returns  are low.  Without  aggregate  fluctuations,  this  correlation 
between  individuals'  demands  for borrowing  and  interest  rates disap- 
pears. For computational  reasons,  we  abandon  the  model  of the  previ- 
ous  section  and  instead  study  asset  prices  and  aggregate  risk  in  an 
extremely  simple  production  economy.  Nevertheless,  this  model  illus- 
trates  the  point  that  the  potential  welfare  gains  from  countercyclical 
policies  that  simply  eliminate  the  correlation  in  individual  risks  are 
small since  the observed  variation in bond  returns is small. 
Consider  now  a two-period  model  of  unemployment  risk assuming 
two  asset  markets: an uncontingent  bond  market and  a stock  market. 
Here,  a share  of  stock  is an  asset  that pays  an  aggregate  state-contin- 
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necessarily  equal  to  aggregate  consumption.  In  this  model,  we  intro- 
duce  an  explicit  countercyclical  policy  based  on  government  hiring 
whose  effect, like the policy  in the previous  section,  is to eliminate  the 
correlation across individuals  in the unemployment  risk that they  face. 
Government  hiring  is  financed  from  the  sale  of  the  output  of  those 
workers  employed  by  the  government.  We  do  not  attempt  to  choose 
parameters  governing  the  pattern  of individual  unemployment  risk to 
match  direct observation  of that risk. Instead,  we  choose  the  extent  of 
that risk so that the model  generates  means  and standard deviations  of 
log  stock  and  bond  returns  to  match  the  data. We  then  calculate  the 
welfare  gains from eliminating  the correlation across individuals  in that 
risk. Our intention  here is to ensure  that we  begin  with  a model  that is 
potentially  consistent  with  existing  asset  price  data.  In  the  following 
section, we  remark on some of the more elaborate models  of asset prices 
in incomplete  markets currently in the literature. Some of these  models 
take up  the  question  we  avoid  of whether  it is possible  to match asset 
price data in a model  with  incomplete  markets in which  the  extent  of 
individual  income  risk is set to match direct observations  of that risk. 
Our model  is an incomplete-markets  model  of asset prices, individual, 
and  aggregate  risk. Let there  be  a continuum  of  agents  in  the  model. 
Let  time  consist  of  two  dates  t =  1,2.  Assume  that  agents  produce 
output  and  consume  at dates  t =  1,2  and  trade assets at date  t =  1. At 
each  date,  agents  either  produce  high  output  (are  employed)  or low 
output  (are unemployed).  Their output  is denoted  by  y/,  j  E {h, 1). At 
each  date,  a random  aggregate  state  z,  E {B, G} is  drawn,  with  q(zt) 
being  the probability of zt. At each date, government  follows  a policy of 
hiring  gt(zt)  agents.  Agents  in  government  jobs  at time  t  have  high 
output  yh. The private sector hires Tr(zt) agents  at time  t. Thus, at time 
t, agents  have  probability gt(zt)  +  1r(z) of being  employed  and produc- 
ing  yh  and  probability  1 -  gt(zt)  -  Tr(z) of  being  unemployed  and 
producing  y[. Agents  have  preferences 
U=  Eo( C  +  -}.  (7) 
Consider  the  following  asset  market  structure. After agents  learn  of 
their employment  status and the aggregate  shock  z1 at date  t =  1, they 
trade  a risk-free bond  and  stock. The risk-free bond  is a sure  claim to 
one  unit of consumption  at date  t =  2, and a share of stock is a claim to 
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date  t =  2.  Agents  are  initially  endowed  with  zero  bonds  and  zero 
shares. Both assets are in zero net supply.  Let  pb(zl)  be the price of the 
bond  and  p,(zl)  be  the  price  of  the  stock  given  the  value  of  the 
aggregate  shock  z1 realized  at date  t =  1. Let  bjl(z1)  denote  the bond 
holdings  at  date  t =  1 of  agents  of  type  j,  given  aggregate  shock  z1 
and  sil(zl)  denote  their corresponding  stock holdings.  Agents'  budget 
constraints  are 
c1(Zl,  il)  =  Yi'  -  Pb(zl)bl(zl)  -  p,(zl)sl(zl)  (8) 
C2(Z1,  Z2, ilI  j2)  = Y2 +  bj'(z1)  + d(z2)jl(z1).  (9) 
The market clearing condition  in the bond  market is 
(T(z1)  +  gl(zl))bh(Zi)  +  (1  -  Tr(Z1)  -  gl(Z))b'(Z)  =  0,  (10) 
and for the  stock market is 
(T(Z1)  + gi(Zi))Sh(Z1)  +  (1 -  (Z1)  -  g(Z1))S(Z1)  =  0.  (11) 
To measure  the  welfare  cost  of  aggregate  fluctuations,  we  calculate 
equilibrium  and  consumer  welfare  in  this model  first given  a constant 
level  of  government  hiring  gt(z)  = g.  We  then  calculate  equilibrium 
and  consumer  welfare  under  a countercyclical  government  hiring  pol- 
icy gt(z)  that attains the same unconditional  mean level  of output  as in 
the  first policy  but  that  also  eliminates  all  aggregate  fluctuations.  We 
assess  the welfare  cost of aggregate  risk as the constant  fraction that, if 
added  to agents' consumption  stream under  the first policy, would  give 
them  the  same ex ante utility as attained  under  the second  policy. 
Certainly, the welfare  cost of aggregate  risk obtained  from this model 
depends  upon  the  parameters  chosen.  We  have  argued  that  this  cost 
depends  upon  the extent  to which  asset prices change  when  aggregate 
risk is eliminated.  We  choose  the  parameters  of  this  model  under  the 
first policy  to match  data on  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of asset 
returns  and  aggregate  consumption  growth.  Clearly, when  aggregate 
risk is  eliminated,  both  the  mean  and  the  standard  deviation  of  asset 
returns  and  aggregate  consumption  growth  will  change.  We  take  fig- 
ures of .018 and  .033 for the mean  and standard deviation  of the log of 
aggregate  consumption  growth,  .06 and .169 for the mean  and standard 
deviation  of  log  stock  returns,  and  .018  and  .055 for  the  mean  and 
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MacKinlay  (1993). As  our  base  case,  we  choose  parameters,  I =  .615, 
y =  -.35,  yh  =  1.039,  y'  =  .166,  yh =  1.060,  y/  =  .170,  7r(B) =  .8075, 
rT(G)  =  .9325,  gt(z)  =  =  .0625,  d(B) =  .84,  d(G) =  1.16,  q(B) = q(G) 
=  .5. We obtain from the model  .020 and .079 as the mean and standard 
deviation  of the log of aggregate  consumption  growth,  .068 and .169 for 
the mean  and standard deviation  of log stock returns, and .018 and .051 
for the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of log  bond  returns. That is, we 
essentially  match the target moments  for bond  and stock returns as well 
as mean log consumption  growth, while  overstating  the standard devia- 
tion of log consumption  growth. 
Under  the  alternative  countercyclical  policy,  we  set  gt(B)=  .125, 
gt(G)  =  0,  which  sets  the  rate  of  unemployment  to  a  constant  .0675. 
Under  this  policy,  the  bond  and  the  stock  trade at the  same  constant 
price.3 The  log  of  aggregate  consumption  growth  is  now  constant  at 
.020, and the bond  return is .018. The welfare  cost of aggregate  fluctua- 
tions  is calculated by finding  the number  k such  that 
((1+  X)Cj)  ((1 
+ 
A)c1  E'  E(  +  )C2)  }EO  j{l+Pi}  (12) 
where  ct  represents  the  agent's  consumption  at  date  t  under  the 
countercyclical  policy.  For our base case parameters, we  find  k =  .0002, 
or a welfare  gain  to eliminating  aggregate  risk of two  one-hundredths 
of  1% of  aggregate  consumption.  For comparison,  the  welfare  gain  to 
eliminating  aggregate  risk in  this  economy  under  complete  markets is 
10 times  greater. This measure  of welfare  gains  to removing  aggregate 
risk is not  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  p,  but  of  course  mean  stock  and 
bond  returns are. 
At the  beginning  of this  section,  we  argued  that  the  low  gain  from 
countercyclical  policy  in  the  model  was  due  to  the  low  variability  of 
bond  returns  found  in  the  data.  To  see  the  effect  of  increasing  the 
standard  deviation  of  bond  returns  on  the  welfare  costs  of  business 
cycles, we  perform the following  experiment. 
To increase  the  variability of expected  asset  returns in  the  economy 
with  aggregate  fluctuations,  we  vary  Tr(B), the  percentage  of  agents 
who  are  employed  given  the  bad  realization  of  the  aggregate  shock. 
This  increases  the  variability  of  aggregate  consumption  growth  and 
thus the variability of bond returns. In Figure 1 we plot the welfare gain 
3. The stock and bond trade for the same price because without aggregate  uncertainty, 
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to eliminating  aggregate  risk against the standard deviation  of log bond 
returns. For comparison,  we also include  the welfare gain to eliminating 
aggregate  risk given  complete  markets for the same range of parameter 
values.  The  bond  variability  and  corresponding  welfare  gains  for the 
first example  presented  earlier are marked "base case" in Figure 1. Note 
that  it  is  possible  to  construct  examples  that  generate  high  costs  to 
business  cycles  but  only  by assuming  large variability in bond  returns. 
5. Asset Pricing  in Incomplete  Markets 
The  two-period  economy  of  the  previous  section  is  obviously  quite 
simple.  There  are  several  more  elaborate  models  of  asset  prices  in 
environments  with  incomplete  markets. In this section  we  discuss  two 
of them, Constantinides  and Duffie (1992) and Heaton  and Lucas (1992), 
and their relationship  of our simple model  to their work. In short, in the 
previous  section,  we  followed  the  method  outlined  in  Constantinides 
and Duffie  to build  a model  in which  agents  are not  exceptionally  risk 
Figure 1 GAIN  TO ELIMINATING  AGGREGATE  RISK 
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averse that has a large equity premium  and relatively smooth  aggregate 
consumption.  In constructing  that model,  we made no effort to use data 
on individuals'  income  risk. Heaton  and Lucas use  data on such risk in 
constructing  their model  of asset prices. We discuss  the implications  of 
their findings  in this section. 
As  mentioned  before,  in  standard  frictionless-trading,  consumption- 
based  asset  pricing  models,  asset  prices  are described  by  a  stochastic 
process  Mt(zt)  known  as a pricing kernel that satisfies 
1 =  Et[Ri,t+lMt+l(Zt+l)],  (13) 
where  R i,  t+  is the  gross return on  asset  i if held  from date  t to date 
t +  1,  and  zt  is  an  aggregate  state  of  nature.  Here,  Mt+l(zt+1)  no 
longer identified  with  the marginal utility of aggregate  consumption  for 
the representative  consumer.  Instead, the  term  Mt+ (zt+  ) is identified 
with  E[3(u'(ci+l)/u'(ct))lzt  +],  the  conditional  expectation  of  individ- 
ual consumers'  marginal utility of consumption  for all consumers  whose 
portfolio choices are interior. In such models,  the highly  variable pricing 
kernels  implied  by observed  asset price data can be obtained  if there is 
sufficient  variability  in  the  conditional  variance  of  individuals'  con- 
sumption,  and, thus, in the conditional  expectation  of agents'  marginal 
utility  of consumption,  across aggregate  states of nature. 
Constantinides  and  Duffie  (1992) demonstrate  a procedure  for con- 
structing individual  consumption  sequences  to match a wide  variety of 
pricing  kernels  under  the  assumption  that  agents  have  identical  con- 
stant  absolute  risk aversion  (CARA) or  CRRA preferences.  Moreover, 
this procedure  can be used  to construct an equilibrium model  of a given 
pricing kernel by endowing  each individual  consumer  with  an idiosyn- 
cratic income  process  y] that satisfies 
Mt+l(Z+l)  =  E 1  Z'(Y'+I  (14) 
Agents  consume  their  income  directly  in  equilibrium  with  no  asset 
trade.  Of  course,  it is not  necessary  in  this  model  that  individuals  be 
endowed  with  their final consumption  stream. It is simply  the case that 
computation  of  the  model  is  much  more  complicated  if  asset  trades 
must  also be calculated. 
In the  context  of  the  model  economy  of  Constantinides  and  Duffie, 
with  frictionless  trade  of  assets,  the  equity  premium  implies  that  the 
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on aggregate  state  z,t+  be both  highly  variable and highly  (negatively) 
correlated with  stock returns. Thus, in this model,  the  equity  premium 
could be taken as evidence  that individual  consumers  face substantially 
more  risk  in  recessions  than  in  booms.  In  fact,  it  is  precisely  this 
principle  that  we  use  in  constructing  our  numerical  example  in  the 
previous  section.  As we  saw  in the  previous  section,  though,  evidence 
that  individual  consumers  face  substantially  more  risk  in  recessions 
than  in  booms  is  not  evidence  of  a  high  cost  of  business  cycles.  If 
countercyclical  policy  eliminates  aggregate  fluctuations  by  eliminating 
correlations in individual  risk, then the welfare gains from such a policy 
in our model  are likely  to be quite small. 
As noted  earlier, we  made no attempt in our two-period  model  to use 
data  on  the  income  risk  faced  by  individuals  to  choose  parameters. 
Heaton  and  Lucas  (1992) begin  their  paper  with  a  review  of  several 
papers  attempting  to  use  data  on  individual  income  variability  to 
calibrate incomplete  markets models  of asset prices. Finding  that these 
earlier attempts were not successful  in generating  sizable equity premia, 
they  turn to a study  of the role of trading frictions in determining  asset 
prices.  We  suspect  that  models  that  attempt  to  match  asset  prices  by 
restricting the trading opportunities  of agents  with  market frictions will 
deliver  lower  gains  to  eliminating  correlations  in  individual  risk than 
reported  here.  Note  again  that  the  gain  to  eliminating  correlations  in 
individual  risk under  autarky is zero. Assuming  trading frictions should 
move  agents  closer to autarky. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we  measure the potential  welfare gains from countercycli- 
cal policy  in  an economy  with  incomplete  markets. In conducting  this 
measurement,  we  see it as critical to distinguish  whether  the main effect 
of  countercyclical  policy  is  to  reduce  the  income  risk  faced  by  each 
individual  or is  simply  to  reduce  the  correlation  across  individuals  in 
the  income  risk that  they  face. In the  first case,  countercyclical  policy 
can have  a direct effect on welfare  by reducing  the risks individuals  in 
the  economy  face.  It also  can  have  an  indirect  effect  on  welfare  if  it 
changes  market-clearing asset prices. In the second  situation, in the case 
in which  countercyclical  policy  simply  reduces  the  correlation  in indi- 
vidual risks, the indirect effect of countercyclical  policy on asset prices is 
the only  effect such a policy  will have. 
We  present  a model  in  which  the  effect  of  countercyclical  policy  is 
simply  to eliminate  the correlation across individuals  in the unemploy- 
ment  risk  that  they  face.  This  model  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the Business  Cycle  Costs  with  Incomplete  Markets  ?  205 
unemployment  risk that  an  individual  faces  is  determined  in  equilib- 
rium by his choice  of search strategy in the labor market. In particular, 
agents  trade off a higher  reservation  wage  against  a higher  probability 
of remaining  unemployed.  Once  agents'  search strategies  adjust, coun- 
tercyclical policy  does  not  reduce  any individual's  chance  of becoming 
unemployed,  it simply  ensures  that  a large  number  of  agents  are not 
unemployed  at the same time. 
Given  this  result,  we  use  asset  price  data  to  calculate  the  general 
equilibrium effects of countercyclical  policy on welfare in an incomplete 
markets  environment.  We  find  this  effect  on  welfare  to be  near  zero, 
since,  with  incomplete  markets, eliminating  the  correlation  in individ- 
ual income  risk does not open  up many new  opportunities  for agents to 
smooth  their consumption.  On the other hand, with  complete  markets, 
eliminating  the  correlation  in  individual  income  risk allows  agents  to 
smooth  consumption  completely.  Thus, the  costs  of aggregate  fluctua- 
tions  in  the  incomplete  markets  economy  is smaller  than  in  the  com- 
plete  markets  economy  for  any  given  technical  specification  of  an 
economy.  Incomplete  markets imply a lower gain to eliminating  correla- 
tions in individual  risk in another sense  as well. With complete  markets, 
it is difficult to generate  an equity  premium without  assuming  a techni- 
cal  specification  that  itself  might  imply  a  high  gain  to  eliminating 
aggregate  fluctuations.  With incomplete  markets this is not the case. 
In this  paper,  we  have  not  considered  the  extent  to  which  govern- 
ment  might  be  able to use  countercyclical  policy  to raise the  long-run 
average  level  of  output  in  the  economy  and,  thus,  agents'  long-run 
level  of  consumption  and  utility.  In  our  model  of  the  endogenous 
determination  of  unemployment  risk,  countercyclical  policy  actually 
lowers  the  long-run  average  level  of  output.  If  policies  that  raise 
long-term  average levels  of output  do exist such policies certainly might 
produce  large  welfare  gains.  De  Long  and  Summers  (1988)  examine 
these  possibilities. Nevertheless,  such gains would  have little to do with 
"smoothing"  the business  cycle. 
In  thinking  about  formulating  policies  to  reduce  individual  risk, it 
may be useful  to investigate  more specific steps government  might take 
to  enhance  agents'  market  opportunities  for trading  risky income  for 
smooth  consumption.  Deaton  and  Paxson  (1993)  and  Attanasio  and 
Davis (1993) present  micro data that suggests  that individuals  may face 
considerable  idiosyncratic  uncertainty  over  the  long  term in their con- 
sumption  streams. One possible reason that agents might have difficulty 
insuring  idiosyncratic  risk is that agents  may have  limited  commitment 
possibilities.  In fact, in  our model  of  endogenous  unemployment  risk, 
the  assumption  of limited  commitment  plays  a key  role in preventing 206 ?  ATKESON  & PHELAN 
risk sharing.  The  extent  to  which  contracts  requiring  commitment  are 
enforceable  is in many  ways  determined  by government  policy. 
Appendix:  Mathematical  Derivation 
of Endogenous  Wage  Model 
V(w): Value of match paying  w. 
Vs:  Value  of being  in search pool. 
By definition, 
V(w)  =  we +  3Ez[p(z)V(w)  +  (1  -  p(z))V].  (15) 
Solving  for V(w)  delivers 
1 
V(w)  =  1 -  p  (wY +  3(1 -  j)Vs),  (16) 
where  ji =  Ez,p(z). Again, by definition, 
V =  max Ez b(z)  3V +  1 -  )(w),  (17)  bz)  b(z)  ' 
or replacing  in for V(w)  and collecting  terms 
Vs =  max  wBP +  (1  - 
wB) PO_-  VS  +  1 
- 
wB  (18) 
w  1-  (1  8  )  -  p  '- 
where  B =  Ez(l/b(z)).  Taking  the  first-order  condition  of  this  and 
simplifying  delivers 
PBB,(1  -  P)Vs  -  Bwy  +  yw~-l  -  ywYB  =  0.  (19) 
If one  solves  Equation  (17) for Vs given  an  optimal  choice  of  w (with 
again much  simplification),  one  derives 
1 -  wB  -,  wW  .  (20)  VS  =(1  - 1)(1  -  wB)w  (20) 
Replacing  for Vs in the  first-order condition  (19) and  simplifying  deliv- 
ers 
w2[B2i]  y  +  w[B(jL(  -  y)  -  (1  +  y))]  + y  =  0.  (21) Comment  *  207 
Note  here  that  if  I =  0,  Equation  (21) implies  Equation  (3)-the  for- 
mula for w for the simple one-period-match  version  of this model  if one 
assumes  an i.i.d. distribution for z. For general ~,  solving  for w delivers 
-(3(1  -  /  y)  -  (1 + y))  +  V([3i(1  -  y)  -  (1  +  y))2  _  41I2 
W  2=fBjyB 
(22) 
The unconditional  probability that an unemployed  agent  becomes  em- 
ployed  equals  wB. From Equation (22), this probability is independent 
of  B; thus, setting  b(z) and  uL(z)  to their mean values  leaves  individual 
unemployment  risk unaffected. 
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individuals  face. Further, the  extent  of available asset  markets is likely 
to  affect the  answer.  In  a world  of  complete  markets,  individuals  are 
able to trade away  all of the  idiosyncratic  risk that they  face, and  each 
individual  faces  the  same  aggregate  risk. Under  some  preference  as- 
sumptions  (such  as time-additive  constant  relative  risk aversion),  each 
individual  consumes  a constant  fraction  of  aggregate  consumption.  In 
this case  the  welfare  costs  of business  cycles  can be  calculated  using  a 
representative  consumer.  Using  a  representative  agent,  Lucas  (1987) 
found  that the cost of business  cycles  is small. 
There  are  several  possible  objections  that  could  be  made  about 
Lucas's  calculation.  First, he  assumed  that  consumption  is  stationary 
about a trend. If shocks  to aggregate  consumption  are permanent,  then 
the  costs  of cycles  will  be larger. Second,  the  preferences  of the  repre- 
sentative  agent  may  be  different  from those  assumed  by  Lucas. If the 
representative  agent  is more  risk averse  than  Lucas assumes,  then  the 
costs  of  cycles  will  be  larger.  A  related  issue  is  the  observation  that 
the  equity  premium  may  provide  a direct measurement  of the  market 
price  of  business  cycles.  Since  the  average  equity  premium  is  quite 
large, the cost of business  cycles may in fact be large. A fourth objection 
is that Lucas's calculations  may  understate  the  costs  of business  cycles 
because  a representative  agent  model  is not  appropriate  due  to market 
incompleteness.  Imrohoroglu  (1989)  examined  this  last  objection  and 
calculated  the  costs  of  business  cycles  to  be  much  larger  than  that 
obtained  by Lucas (1987). 
Atkeson  and  Phelan  reexamine  the  issue  of  market  incompleteness 
and  ask  whether  the  costs  of  business  cycles  really  are  larger  in  an 
incomplete  markets  setting.  They  consider  the  effect  that  a change  in 
aggregate  uncertainty  may have  on individual  uncertainty.  In a simple 
model  of employment  risk, Atkeson and Phelan show  that in reaction to 
a  reduction  in  aggregate  risk,  individual  agents  may  choose  to  face 
more  idiosyncratic  employment  risk. As a result,  the  welfare  gains  to 
reducing  aggregate  employment  risk may  not  be  large.  One  possible 
way  that the  change  in aggregate  risk may  affect welfare  is through  a 
general  equilibrium  effect  on  prices. To assess  this  affect, Atkeson  and 
Phelan consider  a general equilibrium model  of asset markets and show 
that  the  gain  from  reducing  aggregate  fluctuations  in  the  model  is 
smaller in a world  of incomplete  markets than  in a world  of complete 
markets. 
I  first consider  a  model  similar  to  Atkeson  and  Phelan's  in  which 
agents  have  access  to  limited  securities  markets  and  the  equilibrium 
effects  of  a  reduction  in  aggregate  risk  can  be  easily  analyzed.  In 
particular, the fact that a reduction  in aggregate  risk may have no effect Comment  *  209 
on  equilibrium  welfare  can  be  easily  seen.  Further,  the  model  can 
resolve  the equity premium puzzle  of Mehra and Prescott (1985) so that 
it captures the appearance  of large costs of business  cycles. The model  is 
a  special  case  of  the  model  presented  in  Constantinides  and  Duffie 
(1993) and is related to Mankiw's  (1986) model. 
1. General  Equilibrium  Model 
In the  model  there  is a continuum  of  agents  and  agent  i's  income  is 
given  by: 
=  c  iexp(  +  0 logcg  -  log c  -  at)  -  dt  (1)  yt  ct exp (zt  0  t  (1) 
where  ca is aggregate  consumption  at time  t, and  dt is the  dividend 
due  to a holder  of a share of stock at time  t. zt  is given  by 
Z=  z  +  oae1 +  [2p  +  20 log(c/c_)]1/  2.  (2) 
In Equation (1) a  =  p + a2/2.  The utility of each agent  is given  by 
1  F  U=  1-'  _  i[  c\-  (3) 
where  y >  0 is the  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion.  The shocks  {et} 
and  {it}  are  assumed  to  be  independent  of  each  other  and  to  be 
independently  distributed  over  time  and  across  agents.  Further,  for 
each  t  these  shocks  are normally  distributed  with  mean  zero  and unit 
variance. 
Each agent  is endowed  with  one  unit  of the  stock, and  the  number 
(mass)  of  agents  is  normalized  to  be  one.  Under  the  assumption  of 
complete  markets,  there  is  a  representative  agent  with  preferences 
given  by  Equation  (3).  However,  suppose  that  it  is  not  possible  for 
individuals  to write contracts directly on their future labor income,  and 
the only  assets that can be traded are the stock and a risk-free bond. A 
no-trade  equilibrium  exists  where  the  price of  the  stock and  the bond 
are calculated  as if there  is a representative  agent  with  CRRA prefer- 
ences, but the preferences  of the representative  agent are different from 
those  in Equation (3). Instead, the  discount  factor of the representative 
agent  is p* -  P exp(ya  -  y2a),  and the coefficient  of relative risk aver- 
sion  is  given  by  y*  (1 -  0 -  -y)-y.  Notice  that  if  0 <  0,  the  equity 
premium  predicted  by the model  is larger than in the complete  markets 210 ?  HEATON 
case. In other words,  if the variance  of the shocks  to individual  income 
is countercyclical,  the equity  premium  is larger. 
Suppose  now  that  aggregate  consumption  growth,  {log(c[/ca_1)},  is 
i.i.d.  over  time  and  takes  on  the  values  1.051  and  0.985  with  equal 
probability. If  3* =  1.09 and  y* =  29, then  the model  predicts an equity 
premium  of 2% and a bond  return of 3%. If the true value  of y =  4 and 
p =  0.98,  then  under  complete  markets  the  equity  premium  is  0.5%, 
and the bond  return is 8.4%. Notice  that for the model  with  incomplete 
markets  to  predict  an  equity  premium  of  2% when  y =  4,  0 must  be 
-1.3,  which  implies  substantial  countercyclical  movement  in  the  vari- 
ance  of  shocks  to  labor income.  However,  the  model  does  predict  a 
much  larger  equity  premium  than  the  complete  markets  model  and 
should  be a better vehicle  for examining  the cost of business  cycles. 
Under  the  assumption  of  complete  markets,  the  costs  of  business 
cycles  is  assessed  by  finding  h  (an  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of 
consumption)  such that 
(1  +  )1'-YE((ca+/c)l  Y} =  I1-Y  (4) 
where  JL  is mean  (gross)  consumption  growth.  If y  = 4,  k =  0.0017 so 
that  the  costs  of business  cycles  are relatively  small. This is consistent 
with  the  small  equity  premium  predicted  by  the  complete  markets 
model.  However,  under  incomplete  markets, we  use  the  induced prefer- 
ences of individual  j  over aggregate  consumption  growth: 
E(clc1't+l  7} =  E((c 
a 
/ca)'  }.  (5) 
In this case ~ =  19 and, analogous  to Equation (4), k =  0.0137. The costs 
of business  cycles  are much  larger in a world  of incomplete  markets as 
in imrohoroglu  (1989). 
However,  Atkeson  and Phelan  find that the cost of business  cycles  is 
smaller in  an incomplete  markets setting.  They  ask us  to consider  the 
effects on individual  income  risk of a change  in aggregate  income  risk if 
individuals  take  on  more  idiosyncratic  risk  when  aggregate  risk  is 
reduced.  In  the  earlier calculation,  individual  income  risk is  substan- 
tially reduced.  Suppose  instead  that when  aggregate  shocks  are elimi- 
nated,  the  distribution  of each individuals  labor income  stays the same, 
and income  is independent  across agents. In this case aggregate  income 
growth  is  constant  so  that  there  is  a  welfare  gain  under  complete 
markets.  However  under  incomplete  markets,  an  autarkic equilibrium 
still exists; there is no equity premium, but  individuals  are no better  off. As Comment  *  211 
a result, the welfare  gains of reducing  business  cycles are actually larger 
in  a  world  of  complete  markets.  This  means  that  in  an  incomplete 
markets setting,  we  must be very  careful when  assessing  the effects on 
welfare  of changes  in government  policy  that affect aggregate  income 
risk. 
There are several  issues  that are raised by  this  type  of analysis  and 
this  model  of  asset  markets.  First, what  if  the  shocks  to  idiosyncratic 
income  are  calibrated  using  data  on  individual  income?  Heaton  and 
Lucas (1994) examine  an asset  pricing  model  and  calibrate the  income 
shocks using  the PSID. The model  generates  trade in asset markets, but 
to generate  an equity  premium,  market frictions in the form of transac- 
tions  costs are needed.  The model  does  generate  a "net-of-transaction- 
costs" equity  premium,  but it probably is not large enough  to generate 
important  gains  to  eliminating  aggregate  income  variability. However, 
an important  caveat about this model  and the model  of Constantinides 
and Duffie (1993) is that they  do not exactly match the wealth  distribu- 
tion  and  the  distribution  of asset holdings.  As a result, welfare  calcula- 
tions based  on them  must be interpreted  with  some  caution. 
A second  issue  raised by the chapter is, How  should  we  think about 
research  that  tries  to  disentangle  aggregate  versus  idiosyncratic  or 
sectoral  shocks?  This research  may  be  difficult  to  interpret  given  that 
economic  agents  may react to changes  in  aggregate  shocks  so that the 
risk they  face stays approximately  constant.  It would  have been  nice to 
see  some  discussion  of this literature in the  chapter, since  determining 
the  exact  structure  of  aggregate  shocks  versus  idiosyncratic  shocks  is 
central to the issute of the cost of business  cycles. 
The  essential  issue  is  to  determine  the  likely  effect  on  individual 
income  variability of policy  changes  that affect aggregate  income  vari- 
ability. Atkeson  and  Phelan  provide  one  example  in which  a reduction 
in  aggregate  variability  causes  individual  agents  to  choose  strategies 
that  result  in  more  idiosyncratic  income  risk.  This  result  will  not 
generalize  to all settings;  however,  it is an interesting  case  that needs 
further consideration.  To the  extent  that the  analysis  generalizes,  costs 
of business  cycles  calculated  using  a representative  agent  may  in  fact 
put an upper  bound  on the costs. 
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Comment 
JAMES TOBIN 
Yale  University 
The Atkeson-Phelan  paper is an interesting  and ingenious  entry in the 
popular  recent literature minimizing  the welfare  gains of business  cycle 
stabilization.  But I hope  that  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  Council  of 
Economic Advisers  do not shut up  shop just yet. 
I begin  with  a few  general  remarks. 
If nature  imposes  on  Robinson  Crusoe  a fluctuating  income,  beyond 
his capacity to smooth  by storage, maybe it is hard to construct a model 
of his utility  that would  induce  him  to pay  more  than  a pittance  for a 
bargain with  nature to smooth  his harvests. This is not true, of course, if 
Crusoe  faced  finite  probabilities  of  famine  and  starvation,  somehow 
excluded  in calculations  like those  of Atkeson  and Phelan.  The same  is 
true, with  the same exception,  of a society  of representative  consumers 
facing  identical  aggregative  risks with  no  idiosyncratic  risks. Uncorre- 
lated  idiosyncratic  risks,  without  aggregative  risk,  offer  in  principle 
opportunities  to  smooth  everyone's  consumption  simply  by  transfers 
each period  from the lucky to the unlucky,  given  that today's lucky are 
tomorrow's  unlucky.  The accomplishment  of such  transfers is, I guess, 
what  the authors mean by "complete  markets." I guess  that implies  the 
opportunity  to  sell  one's  income  stream  for  a  smooth  consumption 
stream, a bargain ruled out in practice by moral hazard and ruled out in 
law  by  prohibitions  of  slavery.  It  is  noteworthy  that  most  practical 
devices  for redistributing incomes  to maintain the consumption  of those 
whose  wage  incomes  are  interrupted  involve  government  programs, 
and  sometimes  entail  compulsory  membership  in  order  to  forestall 
adverse  selection:  workmen's  compensation,  unemployment  insurance, 
social security. The authors' main point  is consistent  with  this observa- 
tion. They find that the smoothing  afforded "in incomplete  markets" by 
I owe a great deal to discussions of the issues raised by the paper with my colleague 
William  Brainard.  He is an old hand at this sort of topic (see Brainard  and Dolbear,  1971). 
He's not responsible  for anything I say. 
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devices  for redistributing incomes  to maintain the consumption  of those 
whose  wage  incomes  are  interrupted  involve  government  programs, 
and  sometimes  entail  compulsory  membership  in  order  to  forestall 
adverse  selection:  workmen's  compensation,  unemployment  insurance, 
social security. The authors' main point  is consistent  with  this observa- 
tion. They find that the smoothing  afforded "in incomplete  markets" by 
I owe a great deal to discussions of the issues raised by the paper with my colleague 
William  Brainard.  He is an old hand at this sort of topic (see Brainard  and Dolbear,  1971). 
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buying  and selling bonds  and equities  are minimal, even  with  stabiliza- 
tion  measures  when  those  measures  do  not  ameliorate  individual  em- 
ployment  and income  prospects. 
I approach  this paper  as an amateur. I am not  an aficionado  of this 
literature  or  of  the  "real  business  cycle  theory"  from  which  it  is  a 
spinoff. Worse yet, I retain the  prejudices  of my Keynesian  generation, 
which  grew  up  to believe  that  cyclical recessions  and  depressions  are 
socially  expensive  market failures  and  that diminution  of their magni- 
tude  is possible  and  can  significantly  enhance  societal  welfare.  I have 
reason to believe  that the organizers of this conference  were well  aware 
of my  disqualifications  for this assignment  and willfully  ignored  them. 
A  paper  like  the  one  before  us  has  the  merit  of  challenging  the 
endangered  species  of  which  I  am  a  member  to  justify  propositions 
they  had regarded  as axiomatic. 
I  shall  make  two  sets  of  comments.  The  first and  more  important 
concerns what lessons  for practical government  stabilization policies  are 
suggested  by the paper. The paper is, after all, a metaphor.  It examines 
a  model  economy  that  is  designed  to  mimic  certain  features  of  a 
real-world  economy  that bear  on  the  question  being  investigated  but 
otherwise  bear almost no resemblance to actuality. How seriously should 
the  metaphor  be  taken? The  second  set  concerns  some  questions  and 
problems  of detail I encountered  in the specific model  of the paper. 
1. On Interpreting  and  Applying  the  Model 
This paper,  like  other  papers  in  the  literature, estimates  welfare  gains 
from  eliminating  or diminishing  aggregate  fluctuations  of income  and 
consumption  without  altering  their  expected  levels  and  growth  rates. 
The  opposing  view,  my  own,  is  that business  cycles  are for the  most 
part  asymmetrical  departures  from  full-employment  equilibrium,  as 
represented  for example  by "potential"  GDP and consumption.  In this 
view  the essence  of "stabilization" is to raise the mean  performance  of 
the economy  while  also lowering  its variance. Consider estimates of the 
"Okun  gap"  between  potential  and  actual  per  capita  GNP  due  to 
unemployment  rates  in  excess  of  the  lowest  inflation-safe  unemploy- 
ment  rate, if you  like,  the  "NAIRU" or natural rate. The  average  gap 
from  1946  to  1992  in  percent  of  potential  per  capita  GNP  is  2.1  if 
negative  gaps  are  counted  or  2.7  if  they  are  counted  as  zeros.  In 
nonmacro  contexts  no one  would  regard losses  of this magnitude,  $136 
to $175 billion currently, as peanuts.  Gaps of this kind were much larger 
before  World  War II, and  it  is  quite  possible  they  would  have  been 
larger these  past five decades  in the absence  of countercyclical  policies, 214 ?  TOBIN 
both  by  "built-in  stabilizers" in fiscal and  financial institutions  and by 
discretionary  fiscal and  monetary  demand  management  (DeLong  and 
Summers, 1988). Furthermore, it may well  be that the growth  of poten- 
tial  GNP  itself  is  weakened  by  large  and  prolonged  departures  from 
full-employment  potential,  because  they  adversely  and  irreversibly af- 
fect aggregate  saving  and investment  and the human  capital embodied 
in the work  force. 
I realize  that these  Keynesian  possibilities  are ruled  out  in the  paper 
by the equilibrium setup  of the model  economy.  In the land of Atkeson 
and  Phelan,  cyclical fluctuations  result from exogenous  shocks  to labor 
productivity,  certainly  not  from  aggregate  demand  shocks.  Markets 
never  fail to clear, even  momentarily.  If there  is money  in  their econ- 
omy  and  if  prices  are  quoted  in  it,  it  plays  no  role  at  all  in  the 
fluctuations  of real variables. Here "stabilization  policy" does  not mean 
what  it usually  connotes,  demand  management  by fiscal and monetary 
policies.  It would  be  a misuse  of  the  model  and  its numerical  conclu- 
sions  to  abandon  conventional  demand  management  unless  you  sub- 
scribe to the moving-equilibrium  view  of real business  cycle theory. 
It is true that the  authors' model  economy  does  concern  fluctuations 
in employment  and unemployment,  and it does  envisage  compensatory 
public  employment  as  the  instrument  of  aggregative  stabilization. 
Somehow  employers  and  workers  agree  on  (real) wages  each  period 
before  they  know  the  random  draw  of  productivity  growth.  After the 
draw employers  fire workers whose  productivity  is less than the agreed 
wage.  Compensatory  public  employment  is an inverse  function  of  the 
productivity  shock. Competition  among  employers  sets the wage  at the 
level  maximizing  workers'  expected  utility,  as workers  trade off wages 
against  the  probabilities  of  unemployment.  Thus,  unemployment  is 
endogenous  and voluntary.  Moreover,  Atkeson  and  Phelan  contrive  to 
make  each  individual's  unemployment  prospects  independent  of  the 
existence  and  strength  of the public jobs program. 
Thus, in the model  the  only  consequence  of countercyclical  policy  is 
aggregate  stabilization, i.e., in the  authors' words,  diminishing  or elimi- 
nating  correlations among  individuals  in their income  fluctuations.  This 
accomplishes  very  little, because  it limits the  source  of welfare  gain  to 
the  possibility  that the  policy  makes it easier for individuals  to smooth 
their consumption  streams by trading assets among  themselves. 
At  the  end  of  their  paper,  Atkeson  and  Phelan  do  recognize  the 
logical  possibility  that stabilization  might  raise mean  incomes  and  con- 
sumptions,  although  their  model  excludes  it.  That  would  require 
complementary  interaction  between  aggregate  stabilization  and  im- 
provement  in individual  prospects,  a more likely possibility  in the  real Comment  *  215 
world  than  in  their  world.  Observation  suggests  that  the  impacts  of 
aggregate  fluctuations  are concentrated  on a minority of the population 
and labor force, indeed  on persons with  the least access to asset markets 
that  permit  consumption  smoothing  and  hedging  against  unemploy- 
ment  risks. Tenure  professors,  professionals,  and  salaried  white-collar 
workers in general are much less troubled by personal cycles, much less 
vulnerable  to  aggregate  cycles,  and  much  better  situated  to  use  asset 
markets.  (True, in  our  most  recent  business  cycle,  these  groups  were 
suddenly  more vulnerable  than before.) The consequence  is that aggre- 
gate  stabilization  is  of  particular  benefit  to  the  vulnerable  minority. 
Their personal  expectations  of  intermittent  unemployment  are greatly 
reduced,  not  just  rendered  heterogeneous  in  timing.  Atkeson  and 
Phelan  do not consider  this possibility. 
Work  sharing  to  spread  the  impacts  of  reductions  in  demand  for 
person-hours  of labor would  limit the damage  of aggregate  unemploy- 
ment  and  diminish  the  welfare  gains  from stabilization. But unless  job 
sharing  included  the  higher  echelons,  the  basic  point  remains  that 
aggregate  stabilization  diminishes  the personal  prospects  of unemploy- 
ment. 
2. Questions  about  the  Model 
My main complaint  is the absence of any connection  between  the labor 
market  described  in  Section  3 and  the  two-period  economy  with  two 
asset markets and  two  states  of nature in Section  4. For one  thing,  the 
utility function  in Section 3, which  governs  wages,  unemployment,  and 
profits  is  not  the  same  as  the  utility  function  of  Section  4,  which 
determines  saving  and  dissaving  in bonds  and  stocks. The purpose  of 
Section 4 is to give numerical content  to a 2 x  2 x  2 model by assigning 
"realistic" parameter values-to  incomes  of employed  and unemployed 
and  stock  dividends  in  high-  and  low-productivity  states,  to  time 
preference,  to relative risk aversion. The criterion of realism is that these 
numbers  imply  values  of  endogenous  variables-means  and  standard 
deviations  of  aggregate  consumption  growth,  stock returns, and bond 
(actually bill) returns. The calibration is not altogether  successful,  partly 
because  a two-year  economy  cannot  mimic  an  ongoing  infinite  econ- 
omy. 
Specifically,  the  time  preference  discount  is outlandishly  high  if the 
two  periods  are meant  to be years. If they  are meant  to be  decades  or 
quarter  centuries,  then  calibration  of  other  parameter  values  by  real- 
world  annual  values  is not proper. 216 *  DISCUSSION 
In the  two-period  model,  the "stock" pays just one  simple  dividend, 
higher  in  the  good  state  than  in  the  bad  state.  Thus,  there  is  no 
counterpart  of  the  capital-gain  component  of total return  taken  as the 
stylized  fact. 
The  most  serious  complaint  is  that  the  "stock"  in  the  model  is  a 
completely  arbitrary and artificial construct. The authors make no effort 
to identify  it with  claims on  the profits generated  in the wage-employ- 
ment  model  of  Section  3. (Positive  profits are generated  because  risk- 
averse  workers  settle  on  wages  systematically  lower  than  productivity 
in  order  to  lower  unemployment  risk.) Indeed,  the  Section  4  model 
appears  to involve  no  identity  that  tells us  that wages  plus  dividends 
equal  production  on  each  date  in  each  state  of  nature.  Likewise,  the 
government  budget  is not  modeled.  How  are the  jobs  programs  paid 
for? Evidently,  neither by debt issues  nor by taxes. 
Although  the  authors  stress  the  possible  role  of  asset  prices  in  con- 
tributing to consumption  smoothing,  they do not tell us the asset prices 
generated  by their model,  with  and  without  government  countercycli- 
cal job creation, and in the two possible  initial-period  states. One reason 
for  interest  in  these  numbers  is  to  see  whether  interest  rates  are 
procyclical or countercyclical.  They might be higher in a low-productiv- 
ity  initial  state,  reflecting  the  higher  marginal  utility  of  current  con- 
sumption.  This would  be a mark against the  credibility of real business 
cycle  models  that  interpret  fluctuations  as intertemporal  substitutions, 
as against  demand-side  disequilibrium  models,  which  imply  low  inter- 
est  rates in  recessions  because  investments  are constrained  by  current 
and expected  demand  rather than by saving. 
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regardless  of  the  source  of  the  shocks  driving  the  aggregate  fluctua- 
tions.  Atkeson  agreed  with  this  interpretation  and  said  that  it  was 
primarily  out  of  convenience  that  only  productivity  shocks  were  in- 
cluded. 
Peter  Diamond  noted  that  knowing  the  costs  associated  with  risk 
aversion  and individual  unemployment  experiences  was  important  not 
just  for  stabilization  policy  but  also  for  public  finance  issues  such  as 
choosing  parameters  for  unemployment  insurance.  He  cited  work  by 
Jonathan  Gruber,  who  has  used  the  PSID  to  look  at  the  effect  of 
unemployment  insurance  on people's  consumption,  and suggested  that 
this  work  could  be  used  to  calibrate  the  individual  fluctuations  in 
Atkeson  and Phelan's  model. 
Diamond  also  asked  why  employment  and  unemployment  were 
modeled  as single-period,  independent  events  instead  of  a more  com- 
mon  hazard  approach,  where  the  probability  of  employment  condi- 
tional  on being  employed  would  be  much  higher  than  conditional  on 
being  unemployed.  If individuals'  unemployment  risks were  allowed  to 
compound  from period  to period,  then  the fluctuations  in consumption 
would  tend  to be  higher.  He  also  noted  that  if long-term  unemploy- 
ment  spells  lowered  the  probability  of  becoming  employed  by  more 
than  short  spells,  then  there  would  be room  for stabilization  policy  to 
improve  welfare  by  reducing  the  probability  of  long-term  unemploy- 
ment,  even  if there was  no effect on the mean  level  of unemployment. 
Diamond  added  that more attention  needed  to be focused  on character- 
izing  the  distribution  of  the  shocks  since  individual  decisions  will  be 
very  sensitive  to this distribution. 
In response  to Diamond,  Atkeson  said that the optimization  problem 
faced by  workers  would  be  much  more  complicated  if unemployment 
tended  to  persist.  However,  he  suspected  that  even  in  more  compli- 
cated  settings,  the  endogeneity  of  the  wages  and,  thus,  of  the  unem- 
ployment  probabilities would  yield  similar results. 
Olivier Blanchard suggested  that an interesting  empirical exercise  to 
test  the  implications  of  the  model  would  be  to  compute  the  uncondi- 
tional  hazard  rates in  and  out  of  unemployment  and  employment  in 
the absence  of any aggregate  fluctuations.  Blanchard said that a simple 
way  to do this would  be to take the work Steve  Davis and others have 
done  in identifying  reallocative versus aggregate  shocks and to estimate 
hazard  functions  conditional  on  setting  the  aggregate  shocks  to  zero. 
He  guessed  that  the  results  would  be  consistent  with  the  model,  that 
there  would  still be  a substantial  amount  of  reallocation  in  the  econ- 
omy,  and  that  the  unconditional  probabilities  might  not  change  very 
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Herschel  Grossman  asked  why  agents  in  the  model  were  always 
induced  to  choose  exactly  the  same  probability  of being  unemployed. 
Intuitively,  if  the  fluctuations  in  people's  marginal  products  were  re- 
duced,  then  workers  would  be likely  to choose  some  combination  of a 
higher  wage  and  a  lower  probability  of  being  unemployed.  Atkeson 
responded  that the model  was cooked  to deliver this result, but that the 
basic idea  was  that when  workers  choose  the  wage,  they  don't  know 
what  the  aggregate  realization  is,  and  so  they  end  up  picking  an 
unconditional  probability of unemployment. 
Miles Kimball suggested  allowing  for a separation between  risk aver- 
sion and intertemporal  substitution.  In such a specification,  the costs of 
fluctuations  would  be more  sensitive  to low  intertemporal  substitution 
than  they  are  to  high-risk  aversion.  Kimball also  suggested  that  one 
way  to look  at the  effect of aggregate  fluctuations  on the  average  level 
of employment  would  be to see  if the unemployment  rate is convex  in 
various  business  cycle  indicators.  If it is convex,  then  the  fluctuations 
will  tend  to increase  the average  unemployment  rate. 
Daron  Acemoglu  observed  that even  if there  are no  obvious  market 
failures preventing  agents  from trading  with  each  other,  there  may be 
important  negative  search  externalities  in  periods  of  high  unemploy- 
ment  that would  leave  room  for stabilization  policy  to raise the  aggre- 
gate level  of activity. 
David  Romer  said  that  focusing  on  consumption-based  utility  as 
Lucas did was  misleading.  He suggested  that a more realistic specifica- 
tion  would  include  hours  worked,  with  perhaps  some  asymmetry  to 
capture  the  intuition  that the  utility  loss  from working  less  in a reces- 
sion  was  not  equal  to the  utility  gain  from working  less  during  reces- 
sions. 
Randall  Wright  asked  why  the  focus  was  on  business  cycles  rather 
than other fluctuations  such as seasonal or weekly  fluctuations. Atkeson 
answered  that the  paper was  not  meant  to address business  cycles  per 
se, but rather aggregate  risk. 